31 research outputs found

    Maurinian Truths : Essays in Honour of Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th Birthday

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    This book is in honour of Professor Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th birthday. It consists of eighteen essays on metaphysical issues written by Swedish and international scholars

    A new challenge for objective uncertainties and the propensity theorist

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    The paper is concerned with the existence of objective uncertainties. What would it take for objective uncertainties to exist, and what would be the consequences for our understanding of the world we live in? We approach these questions by considering two common theories on how we are to understand the being of propensities and how it pertains to possible outcomes that remain unmanifested. It is argued that both or these theories should be rejected, and be replaced with a theory we call unrestricted actualism according to which the possible outcomes of propensities (whether realized or unrealized) are denizens of the actual world

    Aspect Kinds

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    Shoemaker Revisited

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    Explanatory Grounds

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    Causal Grounds for Negative Truths

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    Truthmaker Internalism and the Mind-Dependence of Propositions

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    Nomological Resemblance

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    Laws of nature concern the natural properties of things. Newton’s law of gravity states that the gravitational force between objects is proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of their distance; Coulomb’s law states a similar functional dependency between charged particles. Each of these properties confers a power to act as specified by the function of the laws. Consequently, properties of the same quantity confer resembling powers. Any theory that takes powers seriously must account for their resemblance. This is the challenge set by the paper. The first part is devoted to Armstrong’s view according to which property resemblance reduces to partial identities between categorical properties. I argue that Armstrong’s solution to the challenge involves accepting determinable properties but that these should not be admitted. In the second part, I argue that dispositional essentialism can satisfactorily account for orderings among powers in terms of degrees of overlapping potentialities
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